

## ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

Date

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)	Initials	Date
1. EXO/DDA	<i>BM</i>	21-10
2. ADDA	<i>J</i>	21 OCT 1985
3. DDA	<i>D</i>	21 OCT 1985
4.		
5. DDA/Reg (File)		

Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

## REMARKS

Copies sent to D/OS and D/OIT.

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, clearances, and similar actions

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)

Room No.—Bldg.

Phone No.

5041-102

\*U.S.G.P.O.: 1983-421-529/320

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)  
Prescribed by GSA  
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.206

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**  
ROUTING SLIP

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR		X		
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI	X			
6	DDA		X		
7	DDO		X		
8	DDS&T		X		
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OLL				
14	D/PAO				
15	VC/NIC		X		
16	NIO/NESA		X		
17	D/NESA/DI		X		
18	C/NE/DO		X		
19	D/OSWR/DI		X		
20	C/TTAC/DI		X		
21	NIO/S&T		X		
22					
SUSPENSE		Date _____			

Remarks

STAT

Executive Secretary

21 Oct 85

Date

3637 (10-81)

85- 3876/2

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Washington, D.C. 20451

OFFICE OF  
THE DIRECTOR

68-1

85-3526/2

October 11, 1985

MEMORANDUM TO THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT  
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: CDC Computer Case for India

Under an approach being proposed by State and others, India would be able to use computers produced under U.S. license in their unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. This could include use in sensitive facilities which produce unsafeguarded nuclear weapons-usable material and in any nuclear weapons-related facilities themselves. I understand this compromise is being pushed in part precisely because India has said that it wants to use such computers in unsafeguarded nuclear facilities including heavy water production. Heavy water can, of course, be used to obtain weapons-usable material.

I strongly believe that we should not go along with such a relaxation of our non-proliferation policy.

We have consistently denied export of computers and other items to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in non-nuclear weapon states. This has been a key part of the Administration's non-proliferation policy since 1981. The fact that these computers would be produced by India under a U.S. license rather than directly exported from the U.S. in no way diminishes the proliferation concern.

Unsafeguarded nuclear activities are key dangers for the spread of nuclear weapons. This is certainly true in the case of India which has, as you know, tested a nuclear explosive device in 1974, may not have given up interest in this area, and has unsafeguarded weapons-usable material.

Should we permit Indian use of U.S. computers in such facilities as proposed by the other Agencies, we would be working contrary to our policy of encouraging India, Pakistan, and others to put their facilities under safeguards. Moreover, Pakistan will see India being treated more favorably than it is.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
DECL: OADR

SECRET/SENSITIVE

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Our ability to convince other countries not to export items to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities around the world -- whether in South Africa, Pakistan, Argentina, Brazil or others -- will be seriously undermined by this approach. We frequently request countries not to provide such exports. If we are unprepared to act in a similar manner, our credibility and effectiveness across the non-proliferation front will suffer.

In our attempt to be responsive to the commercial interests, we should not let this proposed compromise obscure the enormous hole it will make in our non-proliferation position.

Let's face it: the assurances being proposed by other agencies provide no real assurance whatsoever. Therefore, I urge that we stand firm with the original assurances we requested from India. They would provide a sound basis for going ahead with the transaction and would maintain our policy of not exporting items to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.



Kenneth L. Adelman

cc: The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Secretary of Commerce  
The Secretary of Energy  
The Director of Central Intelligence

SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECL: OADR